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1. INTRODUCTION
Causes and consequences of investments in human capital have been a central
field of research in the last few decades for several motivations. Among them, the
relevance of human capital externalities in growth theory, and the issues related
to the dynamics of the wage premium and, more generally, to the evolution of
income distribution. Still, the analysis of human capital externalities is far from
settled from both the empirical and the theoretical viewpoints. Empirically, it is not
obvious that there are significant, positive diﬀerences between social and private
returns, at least at the level of subsidies prevailing in most Western countries.2
From a theoretical viewpoint, the exact microeconomic mechanism generating the
externality is not fully understood. A better understanding of its nature has policy
relevance. This is true even if one is willing to take for granted that there are
no significant, unexploited, positive externalities, because this is typically obtained
with high subsidies to education.3
In this paper, we extend the microeconomic analysis of the externalities related
to investments in human capital and derive some results on the welfare eﬀects of
several policies: fixed tax/subsidies on the direct cost of the acquisition of high skill
human capital, and tax/subsidies on labor income, or - equivalently in our set-up -
on the investment in human capital.
We consider economies with three key features:
1. Workers are ex-ante heterogeneous, while firms are not,
2. Investments in human and physical capital are non-contractible,
3. There are two separate sectors employing diﬀerent kinds of human and physi-
cal capital, so that an agent must choose both the level of his/her investment
and its type.
The economy is basically a two-sector generalization, with sector specific inputs,
of the model considered in Acemoglu (1996). In his framework, firms and workers
choose the amount of their investments. Then, they are matched randomly, and
income distribution is determined by a bargaining process. After agents have chosen
the sector they are going to be active in (hence, the type of their investment), the
model considered here reduces to a pair of separated Acemoglu’s economies. In
our set-up, income distribution takes place through bargaining, too. However,
bear in mind that, when workers are heterogeneous, the crucial feature is non-
contractibility of investments: the bargaining set-up aﬀects several details, but not
some key aspects of the welfare results.
Our main departure from Acemoglu (1996) is that we adopt the notion of hu-
man capital put forth in Roy (1951): there are distinct markets for high skill and
low skill labor, that we assume to be perfectly non substitutable (hence, the two-
sector structure). However, contrary to what is often assumed in Roy models, once
a worker has selected the type of human capital she wants to acquire, she still has
2For the U.S.A., a negative conclusion is reached, for instance, by Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and
Todd (1996) and by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). For E.U. countries, the results in De la Fuente
(2003) are also negative. See also Krueger and Lindhal (2000).
3 In 2005, in the OECD average, 85.5% of the direct cost of education (all levels included) is
financed by public sources (see OECD (2008, Table B3.1, p. 251)). The EU19 average is 90.5%.
At the tertiary level, these percentages are, respectively, 73.1% and 82.5% (Table B3.2b, p. 253).
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to decide how much eﬀort to invest. As common in the literature, human capi-
tal translates one-to-one into eﬃciency units of high skill (low skill, respectively)
labor.4 Most of the recent literature takes a diﬀerent point of view, adopting the
eﬃciency units approach with homogeneous human capital, therefore ruling out, by
assumption, all the consequences of self-selection, which are, instead, relevant from
both the theoretical and the empirical viewpoints.5
With imperfect markets and self-selection of the agents into diﬀerent markets,
two distinct distortions are at work. In the main text, lack of contractibility of
investments and the bargaining set-up generate an hold-up problem, inducing an
ineﬃciently low level of investments, in human and physical capital of both types
(hence, in each sector). Secondly, due to lack of contractibility, agents choose type
and level of their investments looking at the distribution of their expected future
returns, which, in turn, depends upon the distribution of the investments of the
potential partners in each sector. Given that workers are heterogeneous, a switch of
a subset of them from one sector to the other aﬀects the distribution of returns of the
firms, hence their optimal investments. This second potential source of distortion is
independent of the random matching-bargaining set-up, and is at work even when
spot labour markets are perfectly competitive.6 Consequently, public policies have
two distinct eﬀects on total surplus, the index of welfare adopted here. The first
is their direct impact on the optimal investments of the agents acquiring a sector-
specific asset: we will refer to it as incentive eﬀect. The second is the one on the
agents’ distribution across markets: we call it composition eﬀect, following Charlot
and Decreuse (2005) (see also Decreuse (2008)). In "pure" Roy models (with self-
selection, but no choice of the investment eﬀort) only the composition eﬀect is at
play. In "pure" eﬃciency-units models (without self-selection) only the incentive
eﬀect is at work. Our model allows us to study the interaction between the two
phenomena.
We consider two separate sectors, using sector specific inputs (high/low skill
capital). The crucial property is that human and physical capital are heterogeneous.
To identify one type of capital with one sector somewhat simplifies the set-up and
sharpens the welfare results. However, the two distinct distortions would be at
work even with just one productive sector employing both high and low skill labor.
Bear in mind that, whenever in the sequel we mention the two-sector structure of
the economy, we implicitly mean that the two sectors use diﬀerent kinds of human
and physical capital.
Some of the results in Acemoglu (1996) survive in our set-up. For instance, in
both cases, the human capital externality is related to its (sector-specific) average
4As usual, we can also interpret eﬀort as elastic supply of labor of a given skill.
5A survey supporting this claim is in Sattinger (1993). For more recent discussions of the
diﬀerent empirical implications of eﬃciency units vs. Roy models see, for instance, Carneiro,
Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001). Investments in human capital in a two-sector economy with
frictions due to random matching (but with perfectly inelastic supply of human and physical
capital) have been studied in Sattinger (2003), Charlot and Decreuse (2005), and Mendolicchio,
Paolini, and Pietra (2008).
6This case is briefly analyzed in Appendix 2, where, we consider economies with perfectly
competitive spot labor markets, non-contractibility of investments, and asymmetric information.
Due to perfect competition, the hold-up problem disappears, and (taking as given the distribution
of the agents across sectors) investments are at their constrained eﬃcient level. However, due to
asymmetric information and lack of contractibility, the composition eﬀect still induces constrained
ineﬃciency of equilibria, which are always characterized by overinvestment in education.
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level, not to its aggregate level (as postulated in Lucas (1988)). There are, instead,
sharp diﬀerences with respect to the policy prescriptions: in the one-sector model,
subsidies to investments in human capital (or to labor supply) are unambiguously
beneficial. This is because only the incentive eﬀect is at play: a subsidy to the
investments in human capital of any subset of agents increases them and, therefore,
their expected value as a first order eﬀect. This has a positive impact on the firms’
investment decisions and, in turn, further increases the optimal investment of all
the workers. This chain of positive feedbacks guarantees that these subsidies are (in
a neighborhood of zero) welfare improving. To reformulate the point diﬀerently: in
one-sector economies, there is a unique distortion induced by the hold-up problem
which induces underinvestment for both firms and workers. Any policy increasing
the investments of any subset of agents is welfare improving.
With two sectors, the incentive eﬀect of a policy can be strengthened, weak-
ened, or overturned, by its composition eﬀect. In the final section of the paper,
we study the welfare eﬀects of several kinds of balanced budget policies based on
tax/subsidies to the direct costs of education, and on skill-contingent subsidies to la-
bor supply. Consider, for instance, subsidies to low skilled labor income (or a lower
marginal tax rate for low incomes) financed with lump-sum taxes. If total factor
productivities are suﬃciently diverse across sectors, they always increase total sur-
plus, because their positive eﬀect on individual eﬀort in this sector is strengthened
by the composition eﬀect, i.e., by the improvement of the expected quality of the
pool of workers in both markets. An increase in taxes on the direct costs of edu-
cation (again, balanced with lump-sum taxes) also increases total surplus, because
of its composition eﬀect. On the other hand, subsidies to high skill labor incomes
have a (first order) positive incentive eﬀect on the investments of these workers, but
a negative composition eﬀect. Subsidies to the investments in the high-skill sector
have always a negative impact on the equilibrium utility of low-skilled workers (and
on the equilibrium profits of the firms active in that sector). The total eﬀect for
agents active in the high-skill sector may be positive or negative, according to the
magnitudes of the (positive) incentive eﬀect and the (negative) composition eﬀect.
We provide a robust example where the total eﬀect of these subsidies on surplus is
negative.
There is a large literature on the eﬀects of subsidies to education and of labor
income taxes on accumulation of human capital. The usual arguments favoring
subsidies hinge either on their positive externality eﬀects, or on the existence of
liquidity constraints. Additionally, subsidies to education have been analyzed as
one of the components of the optimal mix of redistributive policies (see Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005), Jacobs (2005, 2007), Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008), Jacobs,
Schindler and Yang (2009), Schindler and Weigert (2008, 2009)). The last two
aspects may be both empirically and theoretically important, but we abstract from
them, focussing the analysis on the pure eﬃciency issue related to the presence of
an hold-up problem and of self-selection.
The classical analysis of the eﬀects of labor income tax on investments in human
capital started with the seminal papers by Ben-Porath (1970), Boskin (1975) and
Heckman (1976).7 A flat labor income tax has a negative impact on human capital
accumulation just because of non-deductibility of the direct costs of education. On
7As mentioned above, in our set-up, one obtains substantially identical results considering
direct (non-linear) subsidies to eﬀort and subsidies to the direct costs of education. Previous,
related work in this area includes Blankenau (2005), Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2009), Caucutt
and Kumar (2003), Lloyd-Ellis (2000), Sahin (2004), and Su (2004).
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the other hand, by depressing the net interest rate, in fully specified life-cycle models
of consumer behavior, a tax on total income may actually have a positive eﬀect.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) extend the analysis to (uninsurable) multiplicative wage
uncertainty, pointing out that a flat earning tax aﬀects investments in human capital
through its eﬀects on their riskiness and (via an income eﬀect) on the attitude
toward risk (see, also, Anderberg and Andersson (2003), and Anderberg (2008)).
Consider now a progressive income tax (compared with a revenue-neutral flat one).
The canonical conclusion is that it discourages investments at the high skill level,
while it may encourage them for the less skilled. While the literature provides us
with many insights, it mostly deals with economies where there is no self-selection
into diﬀerent skills, so that one of the key mechanism at work in our economy is
absent. Also, bear in mind that, in our set-up, at the equilibrium, workers face
no uncertainty, so that the mechanism pointed out in Eaton and Rosen (1980) is
absent.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the general
features of the model. Section 3 and 4 analyze the benchmark, Walrasian, economy,
and the one with imperfect labor markets. Section 5 studies the welfare properties
of the equilibria of the economy with frictions. Most of the details are in Appendix
1. In Appendix 2, we sketch the analysis of a perfectly competitive economy with
asymmetric information and self-selection into the two sectors.
2. THE MODEL
The economy is composed by two separate production sectors, denoted by s ∈
{ne, e} .Workers (denoted by a subscript i when we refer to individuals, I when we
refer to their set) and firms (denoted by j and J, respectively) can choose to enter
one of the two sectors, paying a fixed cost. Workers’ costs, (cneI , c
e
I) , are exogenous,
and can be interpreted as private, direct, fixed costs of education (tuitions and the
like). We denote firms’ costs (dneJ , d
e
J) . They are endogenously determined, and
will be discussed later on.
There are two intervals of equal length of workers and firms, ΩI = ΩJ ≡ (0, 1) ,
both endowed with the Lebesgue measure. Each interval is partitioned into two
sets, {ΩneI ,ΩeI} ≡ ΩPI and {ΩneJ ,ΩeJ} ≡ ΩPJ , determined endogenously. Let ν(ΩsI)
(ν(ΩsJ)) denote the measure of the set Ω
s
I (Ω
s
J , respectively). In sector s, production
requires a firm j (with physical capital ksj ) and a worker i (with stock of human
capital hsi ). Once the partitions Ω
P
I and Ω
P
I are given, each sector of the economy
reduces to the set-up studied in Acemoglu (1996). Firms are identical, and choose
their investments in physical capital to maximize their expected profits. Workers
choose their investments in human capital to maximize their expected utilities.
The economy lasts one period, divided into several subperiods. We consider two
versions of the basic model. We adopt as a benchmark a frictionless (or Walrasian)
economy, where, in subperiod 0, firms and workers enter, paying a fixed cost, one
of the two sectors. Then, at 1, each firm active in sector s is matched with a worker
active in the same sector (we will be more precise on the matching issue later
on). Matched firm and worker sign a binding contract on the amount of human
and physical capital that they will supply in subperiod 2. In the final subperiod,
investments are carried out, exchanges and production take place, and agents are
paid on the basis of their marginal product.
In the second version of the model, the one with frictions, the total output
of each match is split according to the Nash bargaining solution with exogenous
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weights β and (1− β) .8 Moreover, and most important, agents cannot contract
with their partners a given level of investment, because these are carried out before
matches take place. To summarize: in subperiod 0, agents choose to enter one
of the two sectors, paying a fixed entry cost. In subperiod 1, they choose their
levels of investment. In subperiod 2, they are randomly matched and then, finally,
production and exchanges take place.
Technologies are described by a pair of Cobb-Douglas production functions with
constant returns to scale. Therefore, in the Walrasian set-up, equilibrium profits
are zero, entry costs dj must be zero for each s, and each firm is indiﬀerent among
sectors. Thus, the equilibrium partition is essentially determined by the labor
supply side of the model. On the contrary, in the economy with frictions, expected
producers’ surpluses are positive in both sectors and, as we will show later on, they
are, at the equilibrium, always larger in sector e. To avoid additional complications
not really germane to our main issue, we want to consider an economy with full
employment at the equilibrium. This requires that, at the equilibrium, each agent
is actually matched with a partner. We assume, as implicit in Acemoglu (1996),
that the matching function guarantees with probability one a match to each agent,
provided that ν (ΩsI) = ν (Ω
s
J) .
9 Given the focus of the paper, the partition ΩPI
must be determined endogenously. Hence, to guarantee full employment, we need
that, at each equilibrium, ν(ΩsI) = ν (Ω
s
J). The easiest way to obtain this property
is to introduce a feature of the economy such that equilibrium expected profits are
always equal in the two sectors.10 One way to do it is to assume that the technology
exploited in sector ne is free, while the one adopted in sector e is protected by a
patent, owned by some outside agent.11 Rights to use the patent are auctioned
oﬀ to firms before the match firm-worker obtains. Given that, at an equilibrium,
expected profits in both sectors must be identical, the equilibrium royalties must
be equal to the (positive) diﬀerence between the expected producer’s surpluses in
the two sectors. Then, at each equilibrium, each firm is indiﬀerent among sectors,
so that we can choose ΩPJ with ν (Ω
s
I) = ν (Ω
s
J). The property we are looking for.
Without any loss of generality, the prices of both kinds of output are set equal
to 1 and, therefore, we omit them.
Finally, notice that there are always three additional, trivial, equilibria: the
ones where all the workers and the firms are in one of the two sectors, and the one
where none is active in any sector. As usual, we ignore them.
8For a rationalization of this allocation rule in this context, see the Appendix in Acemoglu
(1996). We assume that β is sector-invariant. Given that it is exogenous, to let it vary across
sectors would just introduce more notation without any real additional insight.
9A commonly used function which delivers this property is πsj =
min{ν(ΩsI),ν(ΩsJ )}
ν(ΩsJ )
, where πsj
is the probability of a match for a firm active in sector s.
10An alternative solution is to assume that firms cannot move across sectors. A non-null measure
of firms is exogenously assigned to each sector. We then pick a matching function which always
guarantees that each firm is matched with a worker (and conversely) for each non-trivial partition
of the workers. As long as there is a continuum of agents in each sector, this can be done. Of
course, this approach would break down if we had a finite number of agents and, anyhow, is based
on a very ad hoc trick.
11Clearly, nothing would change if each technology was subject to a distinct patent. Also: any
input used only in sector e and with perfectly inelastic supply would do. We consider the case of
a patent to simplify as much as possible the model.
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3. THE FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY
When active in sector s, and matched with worker i with human capital hsi ,
firm j has production function
ysij = A
shsαi k
s(1−α)
j ,
with Ae > Ane. Let µ be the unit price of physical capital, that we assume to
be equal in the two sectors. This implies some loss of generality, but it simplifies
notation and computations. Most important, similar results hold for µe 6= µne.
If active in sector s, and given a match with worker i, firm j solves optimization
problem
choose ksj ∈ argmaxAshsαi k
s(1−α)
j − µksj − wsijhsi .
For each worker active in sector s, the utility function is
Usi (C
s
i , h
s
i ) = C
s
i −
1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
,
where Csi denotes consumption, h
s
i is the amount of human capital (or the labor
supply). Let csI be the (fixed) cost of the investment in sector s human capital.
Then, in the absence of taxes and subsidies, if worker i is active in sector s and
matched with firm j, Csi =
¡
wsijh
s
i − csI
¢
.Workers are heterogeneous because of the
parameter δi, indexing their marginal disutility of eﬀort.Without any essential loss
of generality, we assume that δi = i, and that δi is uniformly distributed on (0, 1) .
More general assumptions on the distribution of δi, or its support, would not change
any essential result. Given that, in the sequel, we will introduce uniform lump-
sum taxes, we must either allow for negative consumption, or assume that workers
have a strictly positive, and suﬃciently large, initial endowment of consumption
good. Given the properties of the utility functions, purely notation-wise, the most
convenient solution is the first one.
It is straightforward to check that the amount of agent i’s investment in human
capital in sector s is given by HWs (δi) ≡
∙
δiαAs
1
α
³
1−α
µ
´ 1−α
α
¸ 1
Γ
, where the su-
perscript W denotes the frictionless economy. Assuming (with no loss of generality
because, at the equilibrium, profits are always zero) that firm j is always matched
with worker i = j, at the equilibrium, we can write the demand for physical capital
of firm j = i as KWs(δi) ≡
∙
δiαAs
1+Γ
α
³
1−α
µ
´ 1+Γ−α
α
¸ 1
Γ
.
Let’s now consider the equilibrium partition ΩPI . For convenience (here and in
the sequel), set cneI = 0 and c
e
I > 0. Let V
Ws(δi) ≡ Usi
¡
HWs (δi) ,KWs (δi)
¢
, be
the level of utility of agent i active in sector s, evaluated at the equilibrium. Worker
i chooses to enter sector e if and only if VWe (δi)−VWne (δi) ≥ 0. A straightforward
computation shows that this inequality is satisfied if and only if
δi ≥ δW ≡
∙
1 + Γ
Γ
ceI
¸Γ ⎡
⎣
Ã
α
µ
1− α
µ
¶ 1−α
α
! 1+Γ
Γ ³
Ae
1+Γ
αΓ −Ane
1+Γ
αΓ
´⎤
⎦
−Γ
. (1)
Hence, for ceI positive and suﬃciently small, there is a unique threshold value
δW , strictly increasing in ceI . All the agents with δi < δ
W do not invest in education,
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while the ones with δi ≥ δW do.12
4. THE ECONOMY WITH FRICTIONS: EQUILIBRIA AND THEIR
COMPARATIVE STATICS PROPERTIES
Later on, we will show that, at the equilibrium, it is always ΩeI = [δ
F , 1), where
δF denote the equilibrium value of the threshold in the economy with frictions.
Hence, we can restrict the analysis to partitions ΩPI and Ω
P
J defined by an arbitrary
level of the threshold, denoted bδ. To emphasize this, we use the notation ΩsJ(bδ) and
ΩsI(bδ).
For future reference, let’s determine the optimal amount of investments assum-
ing that there is a public intervention defined by a pair of vectors ξs ≡ (τs, ζs,∆csI , T ) ,
ξ ≡ (ξe, ξne) , describing (possibly) sector specific subsidies and taxes. We assume
that there are linear subsidies on labor income (with rates τ s, s = ne, e), and on
the cost of the investments in physical capital (with rates ζs, s = ne, e), and fixed
taxes on the direct costs of education, ∆csI (we will always set ∆c
ne
I = 0). T de-
notes a (uniform) lump-sum tax, such that the public budget is balanced. We write
the subsidy rates as sector specific just to simplify the notation. At equilibrium,
this system of subsidies is isomorphic to a system of step-linear subsidies to labor
income and to investments in physical capital.13 Also, bear in mind that our main
qualitative results hold if we start with an arbitrary (linear) tax system, and inter-
pret (τe, τne) as small changes in the tax rates applied to the two classes of workers.
Then, τe ≤ 0 and τne ≥ 0 would define a move from a flat labor income tax to a
progressive one.
Pick an arbitrary threshold bδ. If active in sector s, firm j selects the value of ksj
solving the expected profits maximization problem
choose ksj ∈ argmax
ksj
EΩsI(?δ)
³
(1− β)Ashsαi k
s(1−α)
j − µ (1− ζ
s) ksj
´
− dsJ
= (1− β)AsEΩsI(?δ) (h
sα
i ) k
s(1−α)
j − µ (1− ζ
s) ksj − dsJ , (Πs)
where, given any random variable xs, with xs : ΩsI → R, (or ys, with ys : ΩsJ → R),
E
ΩsI (
?δ)
(xsj) ≡
?
ΩsI (
?δ) x
s
idi
ν(ΩsI(
?δ)) (or EΩsJ (?δ)
(ysi )) denotes the conditional expectation of x
s
i
over the set ΩsI(bδ) (or of ysj over ΩsJ(bδ)).
The pair of maps Ks(bδ, EΩsI(?δ) (hsαi ) , ξ), s = ne, e, defines the optimal invest-
ment in physical capital for the firms active in the two sectors. They are j−invariant
because firms in each sector are identical, and depend upon the exogenous vector
ξ, the arbitrary threshold bδ, and the conditional expectations EΩsI(?δ) (hsαi ) . Let
Πs(δi,bδ,EΩsI(?δ) (hsαi ) , ξ) be the surplus (because inclusive of dsJ) of the firm matched
with worker i in sector s.
12Evidently, the agent with δi = δW is indiﬀerent between the two choices. We assume that
any indiﬀerent agent will actually choose to invest.
13Exactly the same closed form of the equilibrim is obtained considering a direct subsidy to
eﬀort in education of the form τshsαi , which, however, would require direct observability of eﬀort.
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The optimization problem of worker i (if active in s) is
choose hsi ∈ argmax
hsi
EΩsJ (?δ)
(Usi (.)) (U
s)
≡ (1 + τ s)βAshsαi EΩsJ(?δ)(k
s(1−α)
j )−
1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
− (csI +∆csI + T ) .
The pair of maps Hs(δi,bδ, EΩsJ (?δ)(ks(1−α)j ), ξ), s = ne, e, describes the optimal
investments in human capital of the agents in each sector, parameterized by the
variable δi.
Let V s(δi,bδ, EΩsJ(?δ)(ks(1−α)j ), ξ) be the associated level of utility of agent i, if
active in sector s. Worker i enters sector e if and only if
F (δi,bδ, EΩsJ (?δ)(ks(1−α)j ), ξ)
≡ V e(δi,bδ, EΩeJ (?δ)(ke(1−α)j ), ξ)− V ne(δi,bδ, EΩneJ (?δ)(kne(1−α)j ), ξ) ≥ 0,
where F (δi,bδ, EΩsJ (?δ)(ks(1−α)j ), ξ) is agent i’s utility gain due to his investment in
education.
It is easy to check that, for each given (bδ,EΩsJ(?δ)(ks(1−α)j ), ξ), F (.) is strictly
increasing in δi.
Let’s now make precise our notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1. Given ξ, an equilibrium of the economy with frictions is a thresh-
old value δF ∈ (0, 1) , and a royalty deFJ > 0, such that:
i. Ks(δF , EΩsI(δF ) (H
s (.)α) , ξ) solves (Πs) , s = ne for each j = i such that
δi < δ
F , s = e for each j = i such that δi ≥ δF ;
ii. Hs(δi, δ
F , EΩsJ(δF )
¡
Ks(.)(1−α)
¢
, ξ) solves (Us), s = ne for δi < δ
F , and
s = e for δi ≥ δF ;
iii. EΩeI(δF )(Π
e(δi, δ
F , EΩeI(δF ) (H
e (.)α) , ξ))−
EΩneI (δF )(Π
ne(δi, δ
F , EΩneI (δF ) (H
ne (.)α) , ξ)) = deFJ > 0;
iv. F (δi, δ
F , EΩsJ (δF )K
s(.)(1−α), ξ) ≥ 0 if and only if δi ≥ δF .
First, observe that the conditional expectations
n
EΩsJ (δF )(k
s(1−α)
j ), EΩsI(δF )(h
sα
i )
o
,
s = ne, e, are computed making reference to the actual values {Hs (.) ,Ks(.)}, so
that we are imposing rational expectations. Conditions (i− ii) impose individual
optimality in the choice of the investment. Conditions (iii− iv) impose individual
optimality in the choice of the sector where an agent is active. Notice that iii
implies that each firm is indiﬀerent between being active in any of the two sectors,
so that we can impose ΩPJ = Ω
P
I =
n
(0, δF ),
h
δF , 1
´o
(by iv).
The main results concerning existence of equilibria and their properties are
summarized in Prop. 1. The proof is in Appendix 1. Here we just provide an
outline of the argument: first, given an arbitrary bδ, we compute the values ofn eHs(δi,bδ, ξ), eKs(bδ, ξ)o, s = ne, e, the demand functions for investments in human
and physical capital obtained imposing that (conditional on bδ) expectations are
fulfilled. Occasionally, we will refer to ( eHs(δi,bδ, ξ), eKs(bδ, ξ)), and the derived mapseV s(δi,bδ, ξ) and eΠs(δi,bδ, ξ), as the equilibrium maps conditional on bδ.
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Let eF (δi,bδ, ξ) be the analogous of map F (.) , obtained using n eHs(δi,bδ, ξ), eKs(bδ, ξ)o .
If eF (δi,bδ, ξ) is strictly increasing in δi, eF (δi,bδ, ξ) = 0 at δi = bδ gives us the equi-
librium value of the threshold, i.e., δF . Hence, δF is the solution to the equation
eF (δi = bδ,bδ, ξ) ≡ f(bδ, ξ)− a (ceI +∆ceI) = 0,
where, by direct computation (and using eqs. (A3) and (A4)),
f(bδ, ξ) ≡ bδ α1+Γ−α ³AeEΩeI(?δ)(δ α1+Γ−αi )(1−α)´ 1+ΓαΓ χe (ξ)− (2)bδ α1+Γ−α ³AneEΩneI (?δ)(δ α1+Γ−αi )(1−α)´ 1+ΓαΓ χne (ξ) ,
with χs (ξ) ≡ (1+τ
s)
1
Γ (1+Γ−(1+τs)α)
(1−ζs)
(1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
, and a ≡ 1+Γ
α
1
Γ β
1+Γ
Γ
³
µ
(1−α)(1−β)
´ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
.14
Proposition 1. Fix (Γ, α, β). Given (Ae, Ane, ξ = 0), there is eC > 0 such that,
for each ceI with ac
e
I ∈ (0, eC), there is an equilibrium with threshold value δF ∈
(0, 1) . Moreover, given Ane, there is Ae such that, for each Ae > Ae, at ξ = 0, the
equilibrium is unique and ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0. Also,
∂δF (.)
∂τe < 0,
∂δF (.)
∂τne > 0,
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
> 0,
∂δF (.)
∂Ae < 0 and
∂δF (.)
∂Ane > 0, where δ
F (Ae, Ane, ξ) is the function associating with the
vector (Ae, Ane, ξ) the (unique) equilibrium threshold.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
In the sequel, we will mostly consider the leading case where ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0 at
each equilibrium threshold, i.e., we restrict the analysis to economies where A
e
Ane is
suﬃciently large. Also, with some abuse of notation, we will use δF (ξ) to denote
the equilibrium threshold as a function of ξ whenever (Ae, Ane) are treated as fixed.
Remark 1. The restriction to economies with ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0 at each δ
F delivers
two diﬀerent properties of equilibria. It is easy to check that, for bδ suﬃciently close
to 0, we always have ∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0. Hence,
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0 at each δ
F implies unique-
ness of equilibria. Moreover, by the implicit function theorem, the comparative
statics eﬀects (∂δ
F (.)
∂τs ,
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
, ∂δ
F (.)
∂As ) depend upon the the derivatives of the equilib-
rium conditions with respect to (Ae, Ane, ξ) and bδ. It turns out (see the proof of
Prop. 1) that the signs of the derivatives with respect to (Ae, Ane, ξ) are always
uniquely defined. It follows that the signs of the comparative statics eﬀects just
depend upon the sign of ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF . Hence, to restrict the analysis to economies
such that ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0 at each δ
F allows us to obtain well-defined comparative
statics results. Example A1 in Appendix exhibits an economy with ∂f(.)
∂?δ < 0 for
bδ
suﬃciently close to 1. Given that ∂f(.)
∂?δ is a continuous function on (0, 1) , for this
economy f(.) has at least one local maximum, δ. Evidently, each economy with ceI
such that aceI < f(δ), and close enough to f(δ), has at least two equilibria. Hence,
14To avoid misunderstandings: ?F (δi,?δ, ξ), strictly increasing in δi. The function f(?δ, ξ) is ob-
tained setting δi = ?δ and it does not necessarily have this property.
10
this example shows that some additional restrictions on the parameters (such as
the ones provided in Prop. 1) are required to obtain uniqueness, and well-defined
comparative statics properties, of equilibria.
Remark 2. Let f(bδ,Ae, Ane) be the function obtained from f(bδ, ξ) setting ξ = 0
and making explicit its dependence on (Ae, Ane) (similarly for δF (Ae, Ane)). It is
easy to check that
lim?δ→1f(
bδ,Ae, Ane) =
⎛
⎝Ae 1+ΓαΓ −
µ
1 + Γ− α
1 + Γ
¶ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
Ane
1+Γ
αΓ
⎞
⎠ (1 + Γ− α) > 0.
Consider a sequence of equilibrium thresholds
n
δF (Aev, Ane)
ov=∞
v=1
associated with
any sequence {Aev}v=∞v=1 with Aev → Ane. Given that the limit computed above is
positive at Ae = Ane, there is an interval of values of ceI such that the associated
equilibrium threshold is strictly smaller than 1.15 Hence, investments in human cap-
ital of type e may be positive, at the equilibrium, even when this skill is completely
useless, from the technological viewpoint. Indeed, when Ae = Ane, the two sectors
are essentially identical, while to operate in sector e requires the use of costlier skills.
Clearly, Pareto eﬃciency would require us to shut down sector e. This is similar
to what happens in signalling models. The mechanism behind positive investments
in technically useless skills is crucially related to the lack of contractibility and to
the workers’ self-selection into the two sectors. It is an open issue how general this
asymptotic property of the generalized Roy model is in non-Walrasian economies.
Remark 3. Fix ξ = 0. Modulo a redistribution of output, the Walrasian allo-
cation is the unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation of this economy (i.e., δW coincides
with its Pareto optimal level). With elastic supply of human and physical capital,
no allocation rule (i.e., no value of β) can guarantee Pareto eﬃciency of the equi-
librium allocation, because, in the economy with frictions, a firm’s investment in
physical capital does not depend upon the value of δi of the worker it is matched
with, while it does in the Walrasian economy.
Remark 4. At ξ = 0, using (A3) and (A4) in Appendix 1, and by a straightfor-
ward computation, the physical/human capital ratio is given by
eKs(δF )eHs(δi, δF ) =
⎡
⎣ (1− β)
1
α EΩsI(δF )(δ
a
1+Γ−α
i )
1
α
δ
1
1+Γ−α
i
⎤
⎦ K
Ws (δi)
HWs (δi)
.
In sector ne, and for suﬃciently small δi, the term in square brackets is always
greater than one, so that
?Kne(δF )
?Hne(δi,δF )
> K
Wne(δi)
HWne(δi)
, for δi small enough. This imme-
diately implies that agents with a suﬃciently low δi are always better oﬀ at the
equilibrium of the frictional economy. Hence, the Walrasian equilibrium allocation
is not Pareto superior to the one of the economy with frictions. Of course, it still
dominates it in terms of total surplus.
Remark 5. The threshold value δF can be either lower or higher than its value
in the Walrasian economy. For instance, let ξ = 0, and set Ae = 2, Ane = 1,
α = β = 1/2, and Γ = 1. By direct computation, one can verify that, for ceI < 0.019,
15Depending upon the values of the other parameters, we may have (at least) two equilibria
with diﬀerent thresholds, or a unique equilibrium.
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δF < δW , while, for ceI > 0.019, the opposite occurs. Hence, lack of contractibility
always induces Pareto ineﬃciency because of lower than optimal investments, while
it has an ambiguous eﬀect on the size of the set of people investing in education.
From this viewpoint, therefore, it does not induces unambiguously overeducation
(or undereducation).
Our main purpose is to analyze the policy implications of workers’ self-selection
into distinct labor markets. However, it is interesting to consider the comparative
statics of equilibria, also because, obviously, the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent policies
comes through their impact on the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables.
Let φ ≡ (Ae, Ane, ξ) . Let ws(δi, δF (φ) , φ) be worker i’s wage in sector s. The
standard deviation, σ
ΩsI (δ
F )
(δF (φ) , φ), measures the variability of wages within
sector s. WP
ΩeI (δ
F )
(δF (φ) , φ) is the wage premium.16 With tedious, but straight-
forward (therefore, omitted), computations, we obtain the following comparative
statics results.
Proposition 2. Fix (Γ, ceI , α, β). Assume that
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (φ) > 0. At ξ = 0, the
following sign restrictions are satisfied:17
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dτe dτne ∆ceI dA
e dAne
EΩeI(δF )(
eHe(.)) ? + + ? +
EΩneI (δF )(
eHne(.)) − + + − +eKe(.) ? + + ? +eKne(.) − + + − +
EΩeI(δF )
(we(.)) ? + + ? +
EΩneI (δF ) (w
ne(.)) − + + − +
σΩneI (δF ) (.) − + + − +
WPΩeI(δF ) (.) + − − + −
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
The intuition behind these results is based on the interaction of the incentive and
the composition eﬀect. For instance, consider a change in the parameter τne (an
increase in the marginal subsidy - or, if we take as a benchmark an economy with
a flat labor income tax, a reduction in the marginal tax rate - on the income of the
ne workers). As a pure incentive eﬀect, its increase stimulates eﬀort in education
of low-skilled workers, and pushes up the threshold δF (φ). Then, through the
composition eﬀect, it improves the (conditional) expected human capital of both low
and high skilled workers. This, in turn, stimulates investments in physical capital
in both sectors. The positive feed-backs strengthen the initial impacts. Hence, the
eﬀects on expected human and physical capitals and on wages are positive in both
sectors. For the wage premium, by direct computation, it turns out that both direct
16 In general, there are three diﬀerent notions of wage premium: w
e(.)
wne(.) at δi = δ
F (φ),
EΩeI(δF )
?
we(.)
wne(.)
?
and EΩneI (δF )
?
we(.)
wne(.)
?
. Due to linearity in δi of the wage function, here they
coincide.
17Each cell reports the sign of the derivative of the function on the row with respect to the
variable on the column. We omit the standard deviation of the wages of skilled workers. For
this variable, is impossible to reach any well-defined, general result. For reasonable values of the
parameters, α = 2
3
and Γ > 1
2
, some numerical simulations show that the composition eﬀect has
the sign opposite to the one of ∂δ
F
∂φ . Therefore,
∂σΩeI (δ
F )(.)
∂φ is positive for φ
0 ∈ {τe, Ae} , negative
for φ0 ∈
?
τne,∆ceI , A
ne
?
.
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and composition eﬀects are negative. The standard deviation of wages of unskilled
workers increases because both eﬀects are positive. On the other hand, an increase
in the value of τ e has unambiguously a negative eﬀect on the level of human (and,
consequently, of physical) capital and on the wages in the ne sector, because it
decreases the value of δF (φ) (composition eﬀect). Indeed, given that the expected
human capital of the pool of ne workers decreases because of the increase in τe,
physical capital also decreases, depressing further the workers’ optimal investments
in this sector. The impact of dτe > 0 in the e sector is ambiguous because the
incentive eﬀect stimulates additional investment in human capital. However, the
composition eﬀect acts in the opposite direction, because dτ e > 0 induces workers
with a (relatively) low value of δi to switch sector, with a negative impact on the
expected level of human capital in the e sector and, therefore, on the investments in
physical capital, inducing a negative feed-back. The eﬀect of exogenous changes in
technology, (dAe, dAne) , can be explained exactly in the same terms. In particular,
notice that, in this set-up, "skill biased" technical change (dAe > 0, dAne = 0) has
a negative impact on the expected human, and physical, capital and on the wages
in the "low skill" sector, an ambiguous impact in the "high skill" one.
5. EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIA
In Remark 3, we have argued that the equilibria of the economy with frictions
are Pareto ineﬃcient. We will now show that they do not satisfy either a weaker
criterion of constrained optimality (CO in the sequel) which takes into account the
imperfections which characterize the economy. Most interesting it is the analysis of
their ineﬃciency in terms of the amount, and type, of investments. In the sequel,
we will mainly refer to investments in human capital. Similar considerations hold
for the ones in physical capital.
In our set-up, ineﬃciencies can be of two diﬀerent types. First, an individual
can choose an amount of investment diﬀerent from the CO one, given the partition
ΩPI associated with the CO allocation. We will refer to this possible source of
ineﬃciency as underinvestment (or overinvestment) in educational eﬀort. Secondly,
an agent can choose to invest in a type of education diﬀerent from the one assigned to
her at the CO allocation. We will say that there is underinvestment in educational
level when agent i invests in education ne, while, at the CO allocation, she should
invest in education level e.
In the one-sector model, equilibria are unambiguously characterized by under-
investment in educational eﬀort. In our set up, the same eﬀect is at work: in each
sector, given any arbitrary bδ, an increase in the investments of firms and workers
leads to a Pareto improvement. Once we consider an arbitrarily given threshold bδ,
the argument is identical to the one in Acemoglu (1996). Set ξ = 0 (and omit it,
for notational convenience). Fix bδ, so that each sector is identical to the economy
analyzed there, and consider a small change in the investment of each agent. The
changes in utilities and producers’ surplus evaluated at the equilibrium (conditional
on bδ) pair ( eHs(δi,bδ), eKs(bδ)) (and taking into account that investments in physical
capital are j−invariant) are given by
0 <
⎛
⎝αβAs
Ã eKs(bδ)eHs(δi,bδ)
!1−α
− 1
δi
eHs(δi,bδ)Γ
⎞
⎠ dh+
Ã
(1− α)βAs
Ã eHs(δi,bδ)eKs(bδ)
!α!
dk,
(3)
13
and
0 <
⎛
⎝(1− α) (1− β)As
EΩsI(?δ)
( eHs(δi,bδ)α)eKs(bδ)α − µ
⎞
⎠ dk
+
⎛
⎝α (1− β)As
eKs(bδ)(1−α)
EΩsI(?δ)
( eHs(δi,bδ)(1−α))
⎞
⎠ dh, (4)
respectively. The inequalities hold because the first terms in parenthesis in (3) and
(4) are zero (at the optimal solutions of (Πs) and (Us)), while the second terms
are positive. Hence, given any bδ, there is underinvestment in educational eﬀort and
physical capital, in each sector. This establishes, in a more direct way, the Pareto
ineﬃciency of equilibria in our economy.
In the two-sector case, there is a second potential source of ineﬃciency, because
changes in the value of bδ may also entail Pareto improvements. An increase in the
threshold value bδ increases the conditional expected amount of human capital in
both sectors at the same time and, consequently, induces an increase in the amount
of physical investments of firms in both sectors. Indeed, given that δ
α
1+Γ−α
i is strictly
monotonically increasing,
∂EΩsI(?δ)
(δ
α
1+Γ−α
i )
∂bδ > 0, for each s and bδ, (5)
and, consequently, using (A3) and (A4),
∂ eHs(δi,bδ)
∂bδ > 0 and ∂ eK
s(bδ)
∂bδ > 0, for each s and bδ. (6)
More relevant, from (A5), (A6) and (5), for each i and bδ,
∂ eV s(δi,bδ)
∂bδ > 0 and ∂EΩsI(?δ)(
eΠs(δi,bδ))
∂bδ > 0. (7)
These properties do not suﬃce to establish our claim, because a change in the
threshold induces a jump in the producer’s surplus for the firms shifting from one
sector to the other. However, as we will formally establish in Prop. 4, under suitable
restrictions, a suﬃciently small increase of the value of the threshold increases
expected total surplus.
To complete the analysis of the welfare properties of equilibria, it is convenient to
introduce an explicit notion of (constrained) eﬃciency. As usual in economies with
frictions, we consider the metaphor of a benevolent planner choosing an allocation
while facing constraints aiming to capture the ones the agents face in the decentral-
ized economy. We provide two results. First, we show that there are constrained
optimal allocations (Prop. 3), and that they can be attained with an appropriate
system of taxes and subsidies (Corollary 1). The amount of subsidies and taxes
is entirely dictated by the features of the CO allocation, and they can be (in fact,
they are) quite large. That’s why, in Prop. 4 and its Corollary, we study the eﬀects
of small taxes and subsidies on total surplus evaluated at the market equilibrium,
taking as given the actual demand and supply functions of the agents. Prop. 4
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considers taxes and subsidies balanced with lump-sum taxes. The Corollary taxes
on labor income balanced by subsidies to the direct costs of education.
Bear in mind that, in the sequel, we always consider changes in total surplus.
We are not concerned with actual Pareto improvements. However, given that utility
functions are quasi-linear, an increase in total surplus immediately translates (mod-
ulo an appropriate - and i−contingent - system of lump-sum taxes and transfers)
into a Pareto improvement.
5.1. Constrained optimal allocations
The objective function of the planner is defined as the sum of the expected
utilities and producers’ surpluses of the agents, i.e.,
P
¡
hsi , k
s
j ,Ω
s
I ,Ω
s
J
¢
≡
X
s
Z
ΩsI(
?δ)
"
βEΩsJ(?δ)
(Ashsαi k
s(1−α)
j )−
1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
− csI
#
di
+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(
?δ)
h
(1− β)EΩsI(?δ)(A
shsαi k
s(1−α)
j )− µksj
i
dj.
The planner’s policy instruments are the partitions ΩPI and Ω
P
J and a pair
of maps (HCOs(δi,bδ), KCOs(bδ)). We restrict the partitions to have the structure
ΩeI(bδ) = ΩeJ(bδ) = hbδ, 1´ . Given that firms are ex-ante identical, the informational
constraints embedded into the definition of P (.) , and the properties of the (implicit)
matching function, to impose this structure on ΩPI and Ω
P
J does not entail any loss
of generality. Also, observe that, given that firms are identical, expected total
surplus and realized total surplus coincide.
We define an allocation Constrained Optimal (or CO) if and only if it solves
the planner’s optimization problem above. Let δCO be the level of the threshold
associated with the CO allocation.
Proposition 3. Under the maintained assumptions, each economy with fric-
tions has a CO allocation. Equilibrium allocations are never CO, and they are
characterized by underinvestment in the amount of physical capital and in educa-
tional eﬀort. Moreover, for each economy, there is a lower bound ceI > 0 such that,
for each ceI < c
e
I , δ
F < δCO, i.e., overinvestment in educational level holds.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The source of ineﬃciency considered by Acemoglu (1996) reappears in our set-
up, because, given any threshold level bδ, HCOs(δi,bδ) > eHs(δi,bδ), for each δi, and
KCOs(bδ) > eKs(bδ). On the other hand, the relation between δCO and δF is not
univocal. When the direct costs of education are suﬃciently low, we always obtain
δF < δCO. For suﬃciently high values of ceI , however, it can be δ
F > δCO, as
established in Example A2 in Appendix.18 Finally, one can show that, once the
optimal subsidies (τ , ζ) are introduced, to implement the CO allocation we always
need ∆ceI > 0. Thus, CO always requires us to shrink the set of agents investing
18Bear in mind that, in computing δF and δCO, we use diﬀerent investment functions:
( ?Hs(.), ?Ks(.)) and
?
HCOs(.),KCOs(.)
?
, respectively. Hence, there is no contradiction between
this property and the fact (established below) that the surplus associated with the market equi-
librium is always increasing in the threshold value, even when 1 > δF > δCO.
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in the high skill sector (compared to its equilibrium value in the market economy
with optimal subsidies (τ , ζ)).
It is easy to see that the CO distribution of investments in human and physical
capital can be attained with an appropriate system of subsidies to the investments,
and of fixed taxes or subsidies on the direct costs of education. Moreover, given
that preferences are quasi-linear, the system of tax and subsidies can be balanced
using uniform lump-sum taxes (T ) on workers (notice that, in the absence of positive
endowments of consumption goods, this could entail negative consumption for some
subset of agents).
Corollary 1. There is a (balanced budget) system of taxes and subsidies ξ
such that the associated equilibrium allocation is CO.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Remark 6. In our set-up (as well as in Acemoglu (1996)), equilibria of the econ-
omy with frictions are constrained ineﬃcient for each value of β, because, at ξ = 0,
even if δCO = δF ,
eHs(δi, δCO)
HCOs(δi, δ
CO)
= (1− β)
1−α
αΓ β
1
Γ 6= 1, for each s and i,
and eKs(δCO)
KCOs(δCO)
= (1− β)
1+Γ−α
αΓ β
1
Γ 6= 1, for each s.
In the usual random matching model, eﬃciency obtains when the Hosios’ condition
is satisfied, i.e., when β is equal to the absolute value of the elasticity of the matching
function. In our economy there is always full employment, so that no congestion
externality is at work. Therefore, the Hosios’ condition has no connection with
Pareto eﬃciency.19
5.2. The eﬀect of income taxes and subsidies to education on total
surplus
We conclude considering the welfare eﬀects of alternative, balanced budget, tax
schemes. In particular, we study the eﬀect on total surplus of local changes in the
vector ξ, in a neighborhood of ξ = 0. We just consider the eﬀects of (τ ,∆ceI) .
Assume that ∂ ?F
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0. Our first result is that an increase in the direct cost
of education (redistributing the revenues as lump-sum transfer), or an increase of
the subsidies to labor income in the "low skill" sector ne (financed with lump-sum
taxes) always has a positive eﬀect on total surplus. On the contrary, an increase in
the subsidy to labor income in the high skill sector (again, financed with lump-sum
taxes) may decrease it. The intuition behind the result is fairly simple, also given
the discussion of the comparative statics of equilibria in Prop. 2 above. A subsidy
τne > 0 has a direct, positive incentive eﬀect on eﬀort in this sector, and a positive
composition eﬀect on eﬀort in both sectors. This is because it induces an increase
in the equilibrium value of δF (ξ), which, by itself, increases investments in both
sectors. Due to the composition eﬀect, a tax on higher education ∆ceI > 0 has an
indirect, positive impact on eﬀort in both sectors. Therefore, these two policies
19Given any threshold ?δ, as observed in Acemoglu (1996, p. 789), the externalities are related
to "the value of the future matches and are always positive".
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always lead to an increase in total surplus. The third one (τ e > 0) makes sector
e more attractive to workers. Therefore, it induces some workers with δi < δ
F (0)
to switch to sector e. Hence, it has an unambiguous, negative composition eﬀect
on the welfare of the workers remaining in sector ne, and on the expected profits
in this sector. The negative eﬀect on the welfare of the workers in sector e, due to
the composition eﬀect, may actually overcome the positive incentive eﬀect in this
sector, too. More generally, the net eﬀect on total surplus is ambiguous, and there
are economies where subsidies in the high skill sector induce a lower total surplus.
This is established in Prop. 4 and by a final example. In showing these results,
the main diﬃculty is that a change in the threshold induces a discontinuous jump
in the expected producer’s surplus for the firms changing sectors. We provide one
suﬃcient condition which guarantees that, at the equilibrium, the total surplus is
increasing in the value of the threshold. This condition is far from necessary for our
results. The condition is that, given (α, β,Γ) , the threshold value δF must be below
some upper limit δ. Given Prop. 1, this essentially implies a lower bound on the
ratio A
e
Ane . The implicit restriction on the equilibrium threshold is not unreasonable.
For instance, for α = 23 , the total expected surplus is increasing in δ
F if δF < 0.6
and Γ = 0.2, if δF < 0.35 and Γ = 0.5 and so on. The critical value δ is decreasing
in α and Γ.20
To conclude, let’s make formal the heuristic argument above. Given ξ, workers
and firms choose their individually optimal behavior. Let S
³
δF (ξ), ξ
´
be the ex-
pected total surplus corresponding to the equilibrium associated with the vector ξ
of policy instruments. Then,
S
³
δF (ξ), ξ
´
≡
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δ
F (ξ))
EΩsI(δF (ξ))(
eΠs(δi, δF (ξ), ξ))dj (8)
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δ
F (ξ))
eV s(δi, δF (ξ), ξ)di,
with total lump-sum taxes given by
T (ξ) =
X
s
τs
Z
ΩsI(δF (ξ))
ws(δi, δ
F (ξ), ξ)di−∆ceIν(ΩeI(δF (ξ))),
so that the budget is balanced.
Proposition 4. Consider an equilibrium associated with ξ = 0 and such that
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (0) > 0 and
EΩeI(δF (0))(δ
α
1+Γ−α
i ) ≥
EΩneI (δF (0))(δ
α
1+Γ−α
i )
1− α .
Then,
i. ∆ceI > 0, and suﬃciently small, increases total surplus,
ii. τne > 0, and suﬃciently small, increases total surplus,
iii. τ e > 0, and suﬃciently small, may decrease total surplus.
20An alternative suﬃcient condition is that β is "large enough". Notice that, for the class of
economies considered in Appendix 2, total expected surplus is increasing in δF . Here, we need
additional restrictions because of the discontinuity of the expected producer’s surplus of the firms
moving across sectors.
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The proofs of (i, ii) are in Appendix 1, where we also establish that the welfare
eﬀect of a subsidy τ e is, in general, indeterminate. The third statement is shown
in Example A3, in the same Appendix, where we provide a strategy to construct
economies where an increase in τe decreases total surplus.
Changes in expected surplus are our measure of welfare gains and losses. How-
ever, the diﬀerent policy instruments have diﬀerent implications also in terms of
individual welfare. Abstract from the lump-sum taxes. An increase in the value of
τne (or of ∆ceI) has a positive impact on the utility level of all the workers and on
the expected surplus of each firm. On the contrary, an increase in τ e has always a
negative impact on the utility of all the workers in sector ne (and on the expected
surplus of all the firms active in this sector). It may have a positive or negative
impact on utility and surplus of agents active in sector e.
To conclude, let’s consider the policies where subsidies to eﬀort are financed
through taxes on the direct costs of education, instead of lump-sum taxes. The
proof of the Corollary is a straightforward computation and, therefore, it is omitted.
Corollary 2. Consider the balanced budget policies (τ e,∆ceI) , (τ
ne,∆ceI) . Un-
der the assumptions of Prop. 1, and if Γ is suﬃciently small, (τs,∆ceI) >> (0, 0)
and suﬃciently small increases total expected surplus.
The result requires the labor/eﬀort supply to be suﬃciently elastic to the wage
rate. Under this restrictions, balanced budget policies with progressive income
taxation (τ e < 0) and subsidies to the direct costs of education (∆ceI < 0) are
welfare reducing. The impact of the composition eﬀect of such a policy on total
surplus is (under the maintained assumptions) always negative. Evidently, the
impact of the incentive eﬀect is also negative. The restriction on the value of Γ
guarantees that its impact on individual utilities is (in absolute value) larger that
the positive one due to the transfer |∆ceI | to agents investing in education.21
Finally, we have been considering a sector-contingent vector of subsidy rates
(τe, τne) . This is certainly an unusual feature of the policy. However, let ws(δi, δ
F )
be agent i’s labor income in sector s. It is easy to check that
max
ΩneI (δ
F )
wne(δi, δ
F ) ≤ wne(δF , δF ) < we(δF , δF ) ≤ min
ΩeI(δ
F )
we(δi, δ
F ).
Hence, given the properties of the utility functions, the same results can be obtained
with a standard system of step-linear taxes or subsidies. Also, we are taking as a
reference point an economy where ξ = 0. Evidently, introducing a flat tax rate t on
labor incomes, we would obtain exactly the same results by changing the marginal
tax rates.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The paper considers a class of economies where we model both extensive and
intensive margins of investment choices. The main conclusion is that the results
typically obtained in an eﬃciency unit set-up (which considers only the intensive
margin) can fail to be robust to their natural extension to a Roy’s model with
optimal choice of investments in human and physical capital, which accounts for
21 It is worthwhile to mention that these results are at variance with the very high subsidies
to education and high marginal income tax rates prevailing in most European countries, see, for
instance, Figure 1 in Bovemberg and Jacobs (2005).
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both intensive and extensive margins. By assumption, the eﬃciency unit framework
rules out all the phenomena induced by the self-selection of the agents into diﬀerent
labor markets and, therefore, all the welfare consequences related to the composition
eﬀect. While an assessment of the empirical relevance of this eﬀect is beyond
the scope of this paper, from a qualitative viewpoint this is a potentially relevant
phenomenon, with possible significant policy implications.
Our analysis is carried out for a simple, parametric class of economies. This
allows us to compute explicitly the equilibria and the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent
policies, and to compare directly our results with the canonical results of Acemoglu
(1996). Evidently, to consider quasi-linear utility function is restrictive, in partic-
ular in the analysis of the welfare impact of various policies. However, first, an
extension of the analysis to a richer environment is possible, but at an high cost in
terms of analytical tractability. Secondly, all the results are "open", so that they
certainly survive in environments where income eﬀects are suﬃciently small. What
matters most, the basic intuition behind the welfare results is strong, and they
should be robust to many possible extensions of the basic set-up.
7. APPENDIX 1
Existence and comparative statics of the equilibria in the economy with frictions
We start with an arbitrary threshold bδ. Remember that firms are, ex-ante, iden-
tical. Then, for each firm active in s, the first order conditions (FOCs in the sequel)
of problem (Πs) imply
Ks(bδ, EΩsI(?δ) (hsαi ) , ξ) =
"
(1− β) (1− α)AsEΩsI(?δ) (h
sα
i )
µ (1− ζs)
# 1
α
, (9)
and EΩsJ (?δ)
(Ks(.)1−α) = Ks(.)1−α.
The FOCs of optimization problem (Us) imply that
Hs(δi,bδ, EΩsJ (?δ)(ks1−αj ), ξ) = hδiαβ (1 + τs)AsEΩsJ(?δ)(ks1−αj )i 11+Γ−α . (A2)
Let γ ≡ 1+Γ1+Γ−α , so that (γ − 1) ≡
α
1+Γ−α .
Solving (A1) and (A2), by imposing that expectations are fulfilled, we obtain
eKs(bδ, ξ) = ∙ (1− α) (1− β)
µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)(δ
γ−1
i )
¸ 1+Γ−α
αΓ
(A3)
× ((1 + τ s)αβ) 1Γ As 1+ΓαΓ ,
and
eHs(δi,bδ, ξ) = ∙ (1− α) (1− β)µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)(δγ−1i )
¸ 1−α
αΓ
(A4)
×δ
1
1+Γ−α
i ((1 + τ
s)αβ)
1
Γ As
1
αΓ .
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Using these functions, agent i’s utility, at the bδ−conditional equilibrium and if
active in sector s, iseV s(δi,bδ, ξ) ≡ Usi ( eHs(δi,bδ, ξ), eKs(bδ, ξ)) = − (csI +∆csI + T ) (A5)
+
∙
(1− α) (1− β)
µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)(δ
γ−1
i )
¸ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
×δγ−1i β
1+Γ
Γ As
1+Γ
αΓ [(1 + τs)α]
1
Γ
1 + Γ− (1 + τs)α
1 + Γ
.
Similarly, given an arbitrary bδ, firm j (ex-post) surplus, if active in sector s and
matched with worker i, is
eΠs(δi,bδ, ξ) = (1− β)As 1+ΓαΓ ((1 + τs)αβ) 1Γ ³δγ−1i − (1− α)EΩsI(?δ)(δγ−1i )´
×
µ
(1− α) (1− β)
µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)(δ
γ−1
i )
¶ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
. (A6)
Its expected value is
EΩsI(?δ)
(eΠs(δi,bδ, ξ)) = ∙(1− α) (1− β)µ (1− ζs) EΩsI(?δ)(δγ−1i )
¸ 1+Γ−α
αΓ
(A7)
×µ (1− ζ
s)α ((1 + τs)αβ)
1
Γ As
1+Γ
αΓ
(1− α) .
Proof of Prop. 1. Set ξ = 0, and omit it from the notation. Pick the
partition ΩPI (bδ) induced by any arbitrary bδ. Assume that there is an agent i0 such
that δi0 = bδ at bδ solving (f(bδ) − aceI) = 0. It is easy to check that eF (δi,bδ) ≥ 0 if
and only if δi ≥ bδ. Hence, each equilibrium partition ΩPI such that ΩsI 6= ∅, each s,
satisfies ΩeI(δ
F ) =
h
δF , 1
´
, as claimed in the text.
By direct computation, for each threshold bδ,
EΩeI(?δ)
(δγ−1i ) =
1
γ
1− bδγ
1− bδ and EΩneI (?δ)(δγ−1i ) = bδ
γ−1
γ
.
Evidently, both functions are continuous at each bδ ∈ (0, 1). Given that they are
conditional expectations of a strictly increasing function, both are strictly increasing
in bδ. Clearly, f(bδ) is continuous at each bδ ∈ (0, 1). Given that EΩsI(?δ)(δγ−1i ), each
s, is bounded, lim
?δ→0
f(bδ) = 0. Given that lim
?δ→1
1−?δγ
1−?δ =
∂(?δ)
∂?δ |?δ=1 = γ,
lim
?δ→1
f(bδ) = (γAe 1+ΓαΓ −Ane 1+ΓαΓ ) (1 + Γ− α) ≡ _C > 0.
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, for each ceI such that ac
e
I ∈ (0,
_
C), there
is an interior solution to eF (δF , δF ) = 0.
Using (A7), and given that EΩeI(?δ)
(δγ−1i ) > EΩneI (?δ)
(δγ−1i ), and A
e > Ane,
deFJ =
h
EΩeI(δF )(
eΠe(δi, δF ))−EΩneI (δF )(eΠne(δi, δF ))i > 0.
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Hence, all the equilibrium conditions are satisfied at δF . This establishes the
first part of Prop. 1.
We now proceed to study uniqueness of equilibrium and its comparative statics
properties.
Observe that ∂
?F (.)
∂∆ceI
= −a < 0, and that, by direct computation,
∂f(.)
∂τ s
= δFγ−1(AsEΩsI(δF )(δ
γ−1
i )
(1−α))
1+Γ
αΓ
(1 + Γ) (1− α)
Γ
(−1)ϕ(s) > 0,
with ϕ(e) = 2 and ϕ(ne) = 1, so that ∂f(.)∂τe > 0 and
∂f(.)
∂τne < 0. It is also easy
to see that ∂f(.)∂Ae > 0, while
∂f(.)
∂Ane < 0. Hence, uniqueness of equilibrium, and the
signs of the comparative statics properties, could be immediately established if the
sign of ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF was uniquely defined. Unfortunately, this is not the case. As
established in Example A1 below, there are economies with multiple equilibria and
where, obviously, sign|∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF | varies across equilibria. Hence, to establish the
second part of Prop. 1, we need to impose additional restrictions on the parameter
space.
By direct computation, at ξ = 0,
∂f(.)
∂bδ = (γ − 1) 1bδ f(bδ) + (1 + Γ− α) (1− α) (1 + Γ)αΓ bδ
γ−1bδ
×[Ae 1+ΓαΓ EΩeI(?δ)(δ
γ−1
i )
(1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ ηeα(bδ)
−Ane
1+Γ
αΓ EΩneI (?δ)
(δγ−1i )
(1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ ηneα (bδ)],
where ηsα(bδ) is the elasticity of EΩsI(?δ)(δγ−1i ) with respect to bδ. By direct computa-
tion, ηneα (bδ) = (γ − 1) , while ηeα(bδ) = −γ?δγ(1−?δ)+?δ(1−?δγ)(1−?δ)(1−?δγ) . With a straightforward
manipulation, we obtain
Γbδ Γ−1Γ
1 + Γ− α
∙
γ(1−α)
Ane
¸ 1+Γ
αΓ ∂f(.)
∂bδ
=
⎛
⎝ A
e
Ane
Ã
1− bδγ
(1− bδ)bδγ−1
!(1−α)⎞
⎠
1+Γ
αΓ µ
(1− α) (1 + Γ)
α
ηeα(bδ) + Γ (γ − 1)¶− 1.
If ηeα(bδ) ≥ 0 at each bδ ∈ (0, 1) , and 1−?δγ(1−?δ)?δγ−1 is bounded away from zero, the right
hand side of the eq. above is always positive, for A
e
Ane suﬃciently large. Therefore,
for Ae large enough, ∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0 at each
bδ and, in particular, at each equilibrium
threshold. Evidently, if ∂
?F (.)
∂?δ
³
= ∂f(.)
∂?δ
´
> 0 at each solution to eF (bδ,bδ) = 0, the
solution must be unique. Moreover, by the implicit function theorem, ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0
at each equilibrium implies that δF (.) satisfies ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe < 0,
∂δF (.)
∂τne > 0,
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
> 0,
∂δF(.)
∂Ae |ξ=0 < 0 and ∂δ
F (.)
∂Ane > 0, as claimed.
Hence, to conclude, we need the two additional results mentioned above (we
omit the index "b" to simplify notation):
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Fact 1. ηeα (δ) ≥ 0, at each δ ∈ (0, 1) .
By direct computation, ηeα (0) = 0 and η
e
α (1) =
γ−1
2 > 0. Hence, either there
is δ ∈ (0, 1) such that ηeα(δ) = 0 or ηeα (δ) > 0 for each δ ∈ (0, 1) , as claimed.
Consider the numerator of ηeα (δ), call it g (δ) ,
g (δ) = −γδγ (1− δ) + δ (1− δγ) .
Given that the denominator is strictly positive for each δ ∈ (0, 1) , ηe (δ) ≤ 0 if
and only if g(δ) ≤ 0. Clearly, g (0) = g(1) = 0. Given that
∂g (.)
∂δ
=
¡
1− γ2δγ−1 +
¡
γ2 − 1
¢
δγ
¢
,
∂g(.)
∂δ |δ=0 > 0 and ∂g(.)∂δ |δ=1 = 0. Moreover,
∂2g (.)
∂δ2
|δ=1 = γ
¡
γ2 − 1
¢
δγ−1 − γ2 (γ − 1) δγ−2 = γ (γ − 1) > 0,
so that δ = 1 is a local minimum of g (δ) . Hence, if there is a eδ ∈ (0, 1) such
that g(eδ) = 0, there must also be a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that g ¡δ¢ = 0 and ∂g(.)∂δ |δ=δ >
0. Given that, by assumption, δ ∈ (0, 1) , δ 6= 0, and, therefore, g(δ)
δ
= 0, andµ
∂g(.)
∂δ |δ=δ −
g(δ)
δ
¶
> 0. However,
0 <
∂g(.)
∂δ
|δ=δ −
g(δ)
δ
= −γ2δγ−1 +
¡
γ2 − 1
¢
δ
γ
+ γδ
γ−1 ¡
1− δ
¢
+ δ
γ
=
¡
γ − γ2
¢ ¡
1− δ
¢
δ
γ−1
< 0,
because γ > 1. A contradiction. Hence, g(δ) > 0 and, therefore, ηeα (δ) > 0, at each
δ ∈ (0, 1).
Fact 2. Let G (δ) ≡
³
1−δγ
1−δ
δ
δγ
´
. Then, G (δ) > γ > 1, for each δ ∈ (0, 1) .
The result is quite obvious from the geometrical viewpoint. Alternatively, ob-
serve that lim
δ→0
G (δ) = +∞ and lim
δ→1
G (δ) = γ. Hence, to establish the Fact, it
suﬃces to show that ∂G(δ)∂δ < 0 at each δ ∈ (0, 1) . By direct computation,
∂G (δ)
∂δ
|δ=?δ =
γ
(1− bδ)bδγ
Ã
1
γ
1− bδγ
1− bδ − 1
!
=
γ
(1− bδ)bδγ
³
EΩeI(?δ)
(δγ−1i )− 1
´
< 0.
EXAMPLE A1. We show that there are economies such that ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF < 0.
Fix ξ = 0. Let α = 12 , Γ = 10, A
ne = 1, and Ae = 11/10. By direct computation,
f(bδ) = 10.5µ105
110
¶ 11
10
⎡
⎢⎢⎣bδ 121
⎛
⎜⎝11
10
⎛
⎝1− bδ 110105
1− bδ
⎞
⎠
1
2
⎞
⎟⎠
11
5
− bδ 110
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
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∂f(?δ)
∂?δ is strictly positive for
bδ suﬃciently small, and negative for all bδ larger than
some critical value δ. For instance, one can check that ∂f(
?δ)
∂?δ |?δ= 12 < 0, while
n
∂f(?δ)
∂?δ |?δ
o∞
v=0
with bδv → 0 is unbounded above. Clearly, choosing appropriately ceI , we can con-
struct an economy with δF = 12 , i.e., such that
∂f(?δ)
∂?δ |?δ=δF < 0. As argued in Remark
1, this implies that, for some values of ceI , this economy has multiple equilibria.
Ineﬃciency properties of the economy with frictions
The optimal choice ksj is clearly j−invariant and, by assumption, ν(ΩsI(bδ)) =
ν(ΩsJ(bδ)). Hence, the planner’s objective function can be rewritten as
P (hsi , k
s,bδ) ≡ X
s
Z
ΩsI(
?δ)
Ã
βAshsαi k
s(1−α) − 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
!
di− csIν(ΩsI(bδ))
+
X
s
Ã
(1− β)As
R
ΩsI(
?δ) h
sα
i di
ν(ΩsI(bδ)) ks(1−α) − µks
!
ν(ΩsJ(bδ))
=
X
s
Z
ΩsI(
?δ)
Ã
Ashsαi k
s(1−α) − 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
!
di
− (csI + µks) ν(ΩsI(bδ)).
Its optimization problem is
max
(hsi ,k
s,?δ)
P (hsi , k
s,bδ). (P )
It is convenient to decompose (P ) into three problems. First, given an arbitrary
value bδ, we determine the maps (HCOs(δi,bδ),KCOs(bδ)) solving, for each s, the
optimization problem
max
(hsi ,ks)
P s?δ (h
s
i , k
s) ≡
Z
ΩsI(
?δ)
"
Ashsαi k
s(1−α) − 1
δi
hs(1+Γ)i
1 + Γ
#
di (P sδ∗)
− (csI + µks) ν(ΩsI(bδ)).
Next, given the value functions P s(bδ) of the two problems (P s?δ ), s = ne, e, we can
recast problem (P ) as
max
?δ
P (bδ) ≡ P e(bδ) + Pne(bδ), (P )
finding the optimal value of bδ, δCO.
Proof of Prop. 3. Given that optimization problem (P s?δ ) is concave, each s,
its solution is completely characterized by the FOCs:
i.
∂P s?δ (h
s
i ,k
s)
∂hi
= αAsks(1−α)hs(α−1)i − 1δih
sΓ
i = 0,
ii.
∂P s?δ (h
s
i ,k
s)
∂k = (1− α)Asks(−α)
R
ΩsI(
?δ) h
sα
i di− µ
R
ΩsI(
?δ) di = 0,
which imply
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a. KCOs(bδ) = As 1+ΓαΓ α 1Γ ³1−αµ EΩsI (δγ−1i )´ 1+Γ−ααΓ ,
b. HCOs(δi,bδ) = δ 11+Γ−αi α 1ΓAs 1αΓ ³1−αµ EΩsI (δγ−1i )´ 1−ααΓ .
Comparing a−b to (A3)−(A4), KCOs(bδ) > eKs(bδ) and HCOs(δi,bδ) > eHs(δi,bδ), for
each bδ, δi and s. Therefore, equilibria are always characterized by underinvestment
in physical capital and in the eﬀort in education. Demand and supply functions
are clearly well-defined and continuous at each bδ ∈ (0, 1). By substituting in the
objective function the optimal values (KCOs(bδ),HCOs(δi,bδ)), we obtain
bP (bδ) ≡ αΓ
1 + Γ
X
s
v(ΩeI(bδ))As 1+ΓαΓ EΩsI(?δ)(δγ−1i ) 1+Γ−ααΓ − v(ΩeI(bδ))bceI
where 1b ≡ α
1
Γ
³
1−α
µ
´ (1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ
. Given that P (bδ) is a continuous function, problem¡
P
¢
has a solution, either internal or at one of the boundary points, and, therefore,
CO allocations exist.
Compare a market allocation and any CO allocation. If δCO = δF = bδ,
KCOs(bδ) 6= eKs(bδ) and the market allocation is not CO. Otherwise, δCO 6= δF
and constrained ineﬃciency follows immediately.
To establish the second part of Prop. 3, observe that, by direct computation
and rearranging terms, the (necessary) FOC of problem
¡
P
¢
can be written as
0 = γb
∂P (bδ)
∂bδ = γαAne 1+ΓαΓ EΩneI (?δ)(δγ−1i ) 1+Γ−ααΓ +Ae 1+ΓαΓ EΩeI(?δ)(δγ−1i ) (1+Γ)(1−α)αΓ
×
Ã
(1− α) 1−
bδγ
1− bδ − bδγ−1
!
+ γbceI .
Hence, δCO is either the solution to
γbceI = M
CO(bδ) ≡ Ae 1+ΓαΓ EΩeI(?δ)(δγ−1i ) (1+Γ)(1−α)αΓ ×
Ãbδγ−1 − (1− α) 1− bδγ
1− bδ
!
−γαAne
1+Γ
αΓ EΩneI (δ
γ−1
i )
1+Γ−α
αΓ
or δCO ∈ {0, 1} . The condition defining the equilibrium value δF (i.e., eF (bδ,bδ) = 0)
can be recasted as
γbceI = M
F (bδ) ≡ (β (1− β) 1−αα ) 1+ΓΓ bδγ−1Ae 1+ΓαΓ EΩeI(?δ)(δγ−1i ) (1−α)(1+Γ)αΓ
−(β (1− β)
1−α
α )
1+Γ
Γ bδγ−1Ane 1+ΓαΓ EΩneI (?δ)(δγ−1i ) (1−α)(1+Γ)αΓ .
Evidently, MF (0) = 0, while it is easy to verify that MCO(0) < 0. Therefore,
existence of the lower bound ceI with the stated properties follows by continuity.
EXAMPLE A2. Let Γ = µ = Ane = 1, while α = β = 12 , and A
e = 2. Using
the expressions above,
MCO(bδ) ≡ 24
⎛
⎝3
4
1− bδ 43
1− bδ
⎞
⎠
2⎛
⎝bδ 13 − 1
2
1− bδ 43
1− bδ
⎞
⎠− 2
3
µ
3
4
bδ 43¶3 = 32
3
ceI
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and
MF (bδ) ≡ bδ 13
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎝3
4
1− bδ 43
1− bδ
⎞
⎠
2
− 1
16
µ
3
4
bδ 13¶2
⎞
⎟⎠ = 32
3
ceI .
In Figure 1,MCO(bδ) is described by the thick line,MF (bδ) by the dotted one. Notice
that, in the relevant range, MCO(bδ) is concave, so that MCO(bδ)− 323 ceI = 0 is also
a suﬃcient condition for the optimal solution δCO It is clear that that δCO < δF
for ceI suﬃciently small, while δ
CO > δF for ceI large enough.
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Figure 1
Proof of Corollary 1. Obviously, there are many diﬀerent tax-subsidy schemes
implementing the CO allocation. We will focus the analysis on linear subsidies on
labor income and investments in physical capital, and on fixed fees and lump-sum
taxes. Fix ζ
e
= ζ
ne
= β and τe = τne = 1−ββ . It is easy to check that, given any
threshold value bδ, the FOCs of the individual optimization problem in the actual
economy imply that the FOCs of the (constrained) planner’s optimization problem
are satisfied. Let δF (ξ) be the market threshold value associated with ξ.
By direct computation, at the CO allocation, expected profits are zero in both
sectors. Hence, firms are indiﬀerent among sectors. Therefore, at each optimal
solution bδ ∈ (0, 1) , the FOCs of optimization problem (P ) are simply given by
−
h
Uei (H
COe(δi = bδ,bδ),KCOe(bδ))− Unei (HCOne(δi = bδ,bδ),KCOne(bδ))− ceIi
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(
?δ)
∂Usi (H
COs(δi = bδ,bδ),KCOs(bδ))
∂bδ = 0.
Set
∆c
e
I =
X
s
Z
ΩsI(
?δ)
∂Usi (H
COs(δi = bδ,bδ),KCOs(bδ))
∂bδ .
25
Then, given education fees equal to (ceI+∆c
e
I), δ
F (ξ) = δCO and the equilibrium
level of total surplus coincides with its CO level. Finally, redistribute the total net
revenues (or costs) of the fee-subsidy scheme across workers using i−invariant lump-
sum taxes, so to balance the budget.
Proof of Prop. 4. Using the properties of the two sets ΩsI(δ
F (ξ)) and ΩsJ(δ
F (ξ)),
we can rewrite S(δF (ξ), ξ) as
S(δF (ξ), ξ) ≡
X
s
ÃZ
ΩsI(δ
F (ξ))
eV s(δi, δF (ξ), ξ)di+ Z
ΩsJ(δ
F (ξ))
EΩsI(δF (ξ))
(eΠs ³δi, δF (ξ), ξ´ dj)! .
Remember that the net sum of taxes and subsidies is zero. Therefore,
∂S(.)
∂τs
=
∂S(.)
∂δF
∂δF (ξ)
∂τ s
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δ
F (ξ))
∂ eV s(δi, δF (ξ), ξ)
∂τs
di
+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δ
F (ξ))
∂EΩsI(δF (ξ))
(eΠs ³δi, δF (ξ), ξ´)
∂τs
dj
∂S(.)
∂∆ceI
=
∂S(.)
∂δF
∂δF (ξ)
∂∆ceI
.
From eqs. (A5) and (A7), the last two terms of ∂S(.)∂τs are positive. By direct com-
putation,
∂S(.)
∂δF
= −
heV e(δi = δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ)− eV ne(δi = δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ)i
−
heΠe(δi = δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ)− eΠne(δi = δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ)i
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δ
F (ξ))
∂ eV s (.)
∂δF
di+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δ
F (ξ))
∂EΩsI(δF )(
eΠs (.))
∂δF
dj.
By definition of δF (ξ), the first term in square brackets is zero. We have al-
ready established (see eqs. (7)) that the last four terms are positive. eΠne(δi =
δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ) is also positive, because
eΠne(δi = δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ) ≥ EΩneI (δF )(eΠne (.)) ≥ 0.
Hence, a suﬃcient condition for ∂S(.)∂δF > 0 is
0 ≤ ∆Se ≡
Z
ΩeI(δ
F (ξ))
∂ eV e (.)
∂δF
di+
Z
ΩeJ (δ
F (ξ))
∂EΩeI(δF )(
eΠs (.))
∂δF
dj
−eΠe ³δi = δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ´ .
Define
Be =
⎡
⎣ 1
γ
Ae
1+Γ
αΓ (αβ)
1
Γ
µ
(1− α) (1− β)
µ
EΩeI(δF )(δ
γ−1
i )
¶ (1+Γ)(1−α)
αΓ
⎤
⎦ .
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Using γ ≡ 1+Γ1+Γ−α , and (A6), the ex-post profits of the firm matched with the worker
with δi = δ
F are
eΠe ³δi = δF (ξ), δF (ξ), ξ´ = (1− β)ÃγδF (ξ)γ−1 − (1− α)Ã1− δF (ξ)γ
1− δF (ξ)
!!
×Be.
Using (A5) and (A7) ,Z
ΩeI(δ
F (ξ))
∂ eV ei (.)
∂δF
di = Be
(1 + Γ) (1− α)
γαΓ
β
Ã
1− δF (ξ)γ
1− δF (ξ)
− γδF (ξ)γ−1
!
andZ
ΩeJ(δ
F (ξ))
∂EΩej (δF )(
eΠe (.))
∂δF
dj =
1− α
Γ
Be (1− β)
Ã
1− δF (ξ)γ
1− δF (ξ)
− γδF (ξ)γ−1
!
.
Hence,
Γ∆Se
(1 + Γ) δF (ξ)γ−1Be
=
"
β
(1− α)
γα
Ã
1− δF (ξ)γ
(1− δF (ξ))δF (ξ)γ−1
− γ
!#
+(1− β)
"
(1− α) 1− δ
F (ξ)γ
(1− δF (ξ))δF (ξ)γ−1
− 1
#
> 0.
The first term in square brackets is strictly positive (because, as shown in Fact 2
above, 1−δ
F (ξ)γ
(1−δF (ξ))δF (ξ)γ−1 is bounded below by γ). By assumption, the second term
is positive. Notice that the inequality is always satisfied for β large enough.
When ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF > 0,
∂δF (.)
∂∆ceI
> 0 and ∂δ
F (.)
∂τne > 0, so that
∂S(.)
∂τne > 0 and
∂S(.)
∂∆ceI
> 0.
It follows that a subsidy to labor income in sector ne, and/or an increase in the
fixed cost of education ceI , increases the expected total surplus .
On the other hand, ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe < 0 and, therefore, under the maintained assump-
tions, the sign of ∂S(.)∂τe is undefined.
EXAMPLE A3: Welfare-reducing subsidies to investments in human capital
in the high skill sector.
From eq. (2), the sign of ∂f
∂?δ |?δ=δF (.) depends upon the parameters (
Ae
Ane , α,Γ),
and the equilibrium level δF (.) , while it doesn’t depend directly on β. Moreover,
given ( A
e
Ane , α,Γ), the eﬀect of changes of β on the value of δ
F (.) can always be
neutralized by appropriate changes in the parameter ceI .
Clearly,
∂S(.)
∂τe
=
∂S(.)
∂δF
∂δF (ξ)
∂τ e
+
X
s
Z
ΩsI(δ
F (ξ))
∂ eV s(δi, δF (ξ), ξ)
∂τs
di
+
X
s
Z
ΩsJ(δ
F (ξ))
∂EΩsI(δF (ξ))
(eΠs(δi, δF (ξ), ξ))
∂τs
dj
We want to construct an economy such that, at the equilibrium, ∂S(.)∂τe < 0. The
last four terms of ∂S(.)∂τe are positive, and they are easily seen to be bounded above
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(looking at their parametric structure in (A5) and (A7)). Hence, the required result
is established if we can construct an equilibrium with ∂S(.)∂δF
∂δF (ξ)
∂τe < 0 and arbitrarily
large in absolute value. As established in Example A1 in Appendix 1, for A
e
Ane
suﬃciently small, there are economies such that ∂f(.)
∂?δ > 0, for
bδ suﬃciently small
and ∂f(.)
∂?δ < 0 for
bδ large enough. Given that the function ∂f(.)
∂?δ is continuous, this
implies that, for economies in this set, there is δ such that ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δ = 0 and
∂f(.)
∂?δ >
0 at each bδ < δ. Given the values of all the parameters, but the actual direct cost of
education, ceI , pick a sequence {cevI }∞v=1 such that cevI < ceI = f(δ,ξ)a , for each v, and
cevI → ceI . Let
n
δF (cevI , ξ)
o∞
v=1
be the associated sequence of equilibrium thresholds.
By construction, there is a subsequence with δF (cevI , ξ) < δ, and δ
F (cevI , ξ) → δ.
Therefore, ∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (cevI ,ξ) > 0, for each v, and limv→∞
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (cevI ,ξ) = 0. By
the implicit function theorem, ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe = −
∂f(.)
∂τe
∂f(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (ξ)
. Given that ∂f(.)∂τe is positive
and bounded away from zero (see Prop. 1), the sequence ∂δ
F (.)
∂τe associated withn
δF (cevI , ξ)
o∞
v=1
is negative and divergent.
To prove our result we still need to show that there are economies such that,
in a neighborhood of δ, ∂S(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (ξ) ≥ ε, for some ε > 0. In the proof of Prop. 4,
we have defined the expression ∆Se, governing the sign of ∂S(.)
∂?δ |?δ=δF (ξ). It is easy
to check that, given δF (ξ), ∆Se is strictly positive for β close enough to 1. Pick a
value of β, β, such that, at δ, ∂S(.)
∂?δ > ε, for some ε > 0. By continuity,
∂S(.)
∂?δ > ε at
each δ close enough to δ. Change the sequence {cevI }∞v=1 to neutralize the change in
δF (cevI , ξ) due to the new value of β. For the economy so constructed, for some c
e
I ,
it must be ∂S(.)∂τe < 0 and arbitrarily large in absolute value, as claimed.
8. APPENDIX 2: COMPETITIVE SPOT LABOR MARKET
In this final Appendix, we briefly sketch a model with asymmetric information
on the characteristics of the workers facing a given set of firms, and lack of con-
tractibility of investments. These two features, together with self-selection into the
high and low skill sectors, determine the welfare properties of equilibria, charac-
terized by overinvestment in educational level. Contrary to what we have seen in
the text, contingent on the equilibrium threshold, investments are at their (con-
strained) eﬃcient level, because no hold-up problem is at play in this reformulation
of the model.
There is a continuum of separated islands, denoted by c ∈ (0, 1). On each is-
land there is an interval (0, 1) of identical workers and firms. Firms (denoted by a
pair (j, c) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)) are identical across islands. Workers (denoted by a pair
(i, c) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)) are identical within an island (i.e., with respect to the index
c), but heterogeneous across islands, because of the parameter δi, whose realization
in a given island is private information of the workers.22 First, firms and workers
choose the type and amount of their investments. Next, investments are mutu-
ally observable, (island specific) labor markets open and clear at the competitive
22 In the sequel we implicitly assume that the realization of EΩsc(?δ)
(δγ−1i ) coincides with its the-
oretical value. Using appropriate assumptions on the random variables δi, this can be guaranteed.
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wage. Given that, ex-ante, the realization δi is not observable, firms choose their
investments taking into account the (conditional on bδ) distribution of the human
capital of the workers. Preferences and production functions are as above. Given
that firms are identical, they all have the same optimal level of investments in each
sector.
Each worker chooses her behavior solving: given the equilibriummaps (wsi (δi) , sc(j))
and the equilibrium threshold value δ,
choose
©
s
¡
δi, δ
¢
,Hs(δi, δ)
ª
∈ argmax
s
½
max
hsic
EΩsJc(δ) (U
s
ic (C
s
ic, h
s
ic)) s.to C
s
ic = w
s
i (δi)h
s
ic − csI
¾
.
(U2)
where s (δi) ∈ {ne, e} denotes her choice of the optimal sector.
Given the equilibrium maps
¡
wi (δi) , s(δi, δ)
¢
and the equilibrium threshold
value (δ), each firm solves optimization problem
choose
©
s(δ),
¡
Ks(δ),Hs(δ)
¢ª
∈ argmax
s
(
max
(ksjc,h
s
jc)
EΩsIc(δ)(A
shsαjc k
s(1−α)
jc − wsi (δi)hsjc − µksjc)
)
,
with s(δ) ∈ {ne, e} , and where we omit the indexes jc because the firms’ choices
just depend upon s. Bear in mind that (at the equilibrium) expected profits are
always zero, so that firms are indiﬀerent among the sector they are active in
Definition 2. A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of maps
¡
wnei
¡
δi, δ
¢
, wei
¡
δi, δ
¢¢
,
a threshold value δ, and maps
©
s
¡
δi, δ
¢
,Hs(δi, δ)
ª
and
©
s(δ),Ks(δ),Ks(δ)
ª
such
that
i. EΩeJc(δ)(U
e
ic(C
e
i ,H
e
¡
δi, δ
¢
))− EΩneJc(δ)(U
ne
ic (C
ne
i ,H
ne
¡
δi, δ
¢
)) ≥ 0 if and only
if δi ≥ δ,
ii. for each (i, c) ,
©
s
¡
δi, δ
¢
,Hs
¡
δi, δ
¢ª
solves (U2),
iii. for each jc,
©
s(δ),Ks(δ),Hs(δ))
ª
solves (Π2) ,
iv. for each c,
R
(0,1)H
s(δi, δ)di =
R
(0,1)H
s(δ)dj.
We start solving for the ex-post competitive equilibrium, contingent on the ag-
gregate investments in physical capital, K
s
. A straightforward computation shows
that the wage map is given by
ws(δi,K
s
) =
(αAsK
s(1−α))
Γ
1+Γ−α
δ
1−α
1+Γ−α
i
.
Given an arbitrary threshold value bδ, ex-ante, expected profits of a firm active
in sector s are given by
EΩs(?δ) (Π
s(.)) =
1− α
α
(αAs)
1
1−α Es
Ic(δ)
µ
1
ws(δi,K
s
)
α
1−α
¶
kjc − µkjc,
so that the zero expected profit condition imposes
1− α
µα
(αAs)
1
1−α EΩsIc(δ)
µ
1
ws(δi,K
s
)
α
1−α
¶
= 1.
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Replacing ws(δi,K
s
) into this condition, we obtain
eKs(bδ) = µ1− α
µ
¶ 1+Γ−α
αΓ
α
1
ΓAs
1+Γ
αΓ EΩsIc(δ)(δ
γ−1
i )
1+Γ−α
αΓ .
Replacing this condition into ws(δi,K
s
), we obtain the bδ−conditional equilibrium
map
ws(δi,bδ) = (αAs)
1
α
³
1−α
µα
´ 1−α
α
EΩsIc(δ)(δ
γ−1
i )
1−α
α
δ
1−α
1+Γ−α
i
.
Finally, given bδ, i’s supply of eﬀort (if active in sector s and conditional on bδ) is
eHs(δi,bδ) = δ 11+Γ−αi α 1ΓAs 1αΓ ∙1− αµ EΩsIc(δ)(δγ−1i )
¸ 1−α
αΓ
,
so that the value of the indirect utility function (if s) is
eV s(δi,bδ) = Γ
1 + Γ
Ãµ
1− α
µα
EΩsIc(?δ)
(δγ−1i )
¶(1−α)
αAs
! (1+Γ)
αΓ
δ
α
1+Γ−α
i − csI .\
The map defining the equilibrium threshold is then
0 = bδ α1+Γ−α (AeEΩsIc(?δ)(δγ−1i )(1−α)) (1+Γ)αΓ (10)
−bδ α1+Γ−α (AneE
ΩsIc(
?δ)
(δγ−1i )
(1−α))
(1+Γ)
αΓ − bceI ,
with b = 1+Γ
Γ( 1−αµα )
(1−α)(1+Γ)
αΓ α
1+Γ
αΓ
.
Modulo a multiplicative term, this expression is identical to eq. (2) in the text.
Evidently, the qualitative properties of equilibria are identical in the two classes of
economies.
There is, however, an important diﬀerence with respect to eﬃciency. Accord-
ing to the definition of CO introduced above, in this set-up, the supply of human
and physical capital is CO, given that eKs(bδ) and eHs(δi,bδ) coincide with the mapsn
HCOs(δi,bδ),KCO(bδ)o computed in the proof of Prop. 3. Hence, perfect com-
petition in the spot labor markets eliminates the distortion related to the hold-up
problem. It follows that, if δF = δCO, the market equilibrium is CO. However, it
is easy to see that it is always δF < δCO, i.e., there is always overinvestment in the
education level. Indeed, given that expected profits are always zero, the planner’s
objective function reduces to
P (bδ) = Z ?δ
0
eV ne(δi,bδ)di+ Z 1
?δ
eV e(δi,bδ)di,
with FOC
∂P (bδ)
∂bδ = −
heV e(δi = bδ,bδ)− eV ne(δi = bδ,bδ)i
+
Z ?δ
0
∂ eV ne(δi,bδ)
∂bδ di+
Z 1
?δ
∂ eV e(δi,bδ)
∂bδ di.
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The last two terms are always strictly positive. Given that, by definition of δF , the
term in square brackets is zero, at δF , ∂P (
?δ)
∂?δ > 0. Hence, δ
CO > δF , so that we
have always overinvestment in education level, at the equilibrium.
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